贵州省人大常委会


玉屏侗族自治县自治条例

　　（1988年4月9日玉屏侗族自治县第二届人民代表大会第二次会议通过 1988年7月15日贵州省第七届人民代表大会常务委员会第三次会议批准 根据2006年3月6日玉屏侗族自治县第六届人民代表大会第四次会议通过，2006年5月26日贵州省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十一次会议批准的《玉屏侗族自治县人民代表大会关于修改〈玉屏侗族自治县自治条例〉的决定》修正）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第一章　　　总　　则
　
　　第一条 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》和《中华人民共和国民族区域自治法》的规定，结合玉屏侗族自治县（以下简称自治县）民族的政治、经济和文化的特点，制定本条例。
　　第二条 自治县的自治机关是自治县人民代表大会和自治县人民政府。
　　自治县的自治机关设在平溪镇。
　　自治县的自治机关实行民主集中制的原则。
　　第三条 自治县的自治机关维护国家的统一，保证宪法和法律在自治县的遵守和执行，把国家的整体利益放在首位，积极完成上级国家机关交给的各项任务。
　　第四条 自治县的自治机关行使宪法规定的县级国家机关的职权，同时依照宪法和民族区域自治法以及其他法律规定的权限行使自治权。
　　自治县的自治机关根据实际情况，在不违背宪法和法律的原则下，采取特殊政策和灵活措施，加快经济社会事业的发展。
　　自治县的自治机关对上级国家机关的决议、决定、命令和指示，如有不适合自治县实际情况的，报经该上级国家机关批准，可以变通执行或者停止执行。
　　第五条 自治县的自治机关保障各民族人民的合法权益，教育各民族干部和群众互相尊重、互相学习、互相合作、互相帮助，维护和发展平等、团结、互助、和谐的社会主义民族关系，禁止对任何民族的歧视和破坏民族团结的行为。
第六条 自治县的自治机关保护归侨、侨眷，香港特别行政区居民、澳门特别行政区居民和台湾同胞在自治县的合法权益。
　　第七条 自治县的自治机关提倡爱祖国、爱人民、爱劳动、爱科学、爱社会主义的公德，培养有理想、有道德、有文化、有纪律的社会主义公民。
　　第八条 自治县的自治机关带领自治县各族人民，在中国共产党的领导下，坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，以科学发展观统领经济社会发展全局，围绕各民族共同团结奋斗、共同繁荣发展的主题，以经济建设为中心，发展社会主义市场经济，坚持改革开放，集中力量进行社会主义现代化建设，推进社会主义物质文明、政治文明、精神文明建设与和谐社会建设全面发展。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第二章　　　自治机关和人民法院、人民检察院

　　第九条 自治县人民代表大会是自治县的地方国家权力机关，它的常设机关是自治县人民代表大会常务委员会。
　　自治县人民代表大会中，除侗族代表外，其他民族应当有适当名额的代表。各民族代表的名额和比例，按照选举法和贵州省人民代表大会常务委员会的规定确定。
　　自治县人民代表大会常务委员会中，侗族人员可以超过半数，其他民族亦应有适当数量的人员，并且应当有侗族公民担任主任或者副主任。
　　第十条 自治县人民政府是自治县人民代表大会的执行机关，是自治县的地方国家行政机关，对本级人民代表大会及其常务委员会和上级国家行政机关负责并报告工作。
　　自治县县长由侗族公民担任。自治县人民政府的其他组成人员中，侗族人员可以超过半数，同时注意配备其他民族人员。
　　自治县人民政府实行县长负责制。
　　第十一条 自治县的自治机关根据自治县的特点和需要，报经上级国家机关批准，合理设置工作部门，并在上级国家机关确定的总编制内，自主安排和调剂各部门的编制员额。
　　第十二条 自治县的国家机关及其工作部门，应当合理配备侗族和其他少数民族领导干部，在公开选拔、竞争上岗配备领导干部时，可以划出相应的名额和岗位，定向选拔侗族和其他少数民族干部。
　　自治县在录用、聘用国家工作人员时，对侗族和其他少数民族给予照顾。
　　第十三条 自治县人民法院和人民检察院应当有侗族公民担任院长或者副院长、检察长或者副检察长。
　　自治县人民法院和人民检察院应当配备适当数量的侗族和其他民族的工作人员。
　　第十四条 自治县人民法院和人民检察院应当用侗语或者汉语文审理和检察案件，保障各民族公民都有使用本民族语言文字进行诉讼的权利，对于不通晓侗语或者汉语的诉讼参与人，应当为他们提供翻译。
　　第十五条 自治县的自治机关采取措施，从自治县各民族中培养使用各级干部，重视培养使用妇女干部和少数民族干部。
　　自治县的自治机关采取各种措施培养使用各种专业技术人才。开展多种形式的技术培训和就业培训，提高劳动者技能。
　　第十六条 自治县的自治机关制定优惠政策，吸引各类专业技术人才参加自治县的各项建设事业。
　　第十七条 自治县的自治机关对在各项建设中成绩显著的单位和个人给予表彰和奖励。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第三章　　　经济建设

　　第十八条 自治县的自治机关在国家宏观经济政策指导下，根据实际，制定经济建设的方针、政策和规划，自主安排和管理自治县的经济建设事业。
　　自治县的经济建设，坚持全面、协调、可持续发展的方针，发挥区位优势，合理利用资源，调整经济产业结构，大力发展工业、加强农业基础建设、繁荣商业贸易、发展旅游业，促进县域经济发展。
　　第十九条 自治县的自治机关鼓励、引导和支持非公有制经济发展。鼓励社会资本参与自治县的基础设施、公用事业以及其他领域的建设。
　　第二十条 自治县的自治机关坚持新型工业化发展方向，合理规划工业布局，优化工业产业结构，培育优势企业，提高工业经济运行质量和效益。
　　自治县鼓励发展玉屏箫笛等民族传统手工业品和少数民族特需商品生产，享受国家优惠政策的照顾。
　　第二十一条 自治县扩大对外开放，加强对外交流与合作，利用有利条件和国家给予的优惠政策，招商引资，加快经济发展。
　　自治县的自治机关鼓励企业参与市场竞争，发展对外贸易，支持优势产品出口。
　　第二十二条 自治县的自治机关统一管理和监督自治县本行政区域内国土资源的保护、开发和利用，实行严格的耕地保护制度、土地用途管制制度和土地有偿使用制度。
　　自治县征收的新增建设用地的土地有偿使用费，专项用于土地的开发整理，并享受上级国家机关的照顾。
　　自治县加强水土保持，严禁在陡坡地和禁垦的区域内开垦。
　　第二十三条 自治县按照生产发展、生活宽裕、乡风文明、村容整洁、管理民主的要求，统一规划，循序渐进，节约土地，集约发展，合理布局，扎实稳步推进新阶段扶贫开发和社会主义新农村建设。
　　自治县的自治机关稳定和完善以家庭承包经营为基础、统分结合的双层经营体制。按照自愿、有偿的原则依法流转土地承包经营权，保护农村集体经济组织和农业生产经营者的合法权益。
　　第二十四条 自治县的自治机关增加对农业的投入，加强农业基础设施建设，改善农业生产条件，调整农业产业结构，推广农业新技术，发展粮食生产和特色农业、生态农业，建立健全农业社会化服务体系。
　　第二十五条 自治县的自治机关鼓励和支持各种经济组织和个人依法投资兴办电力生产企业。
　　第二十六条 自治县的自治机关加强水资源的保护和管理，科学规划，综合利用，合理开发，节约用水，安全用水，发挥水资源的综合效益。
　　自治县加强水利基础设施建设、管理和小流域综合治理。
　　自治县实行取水许可制度和水资源有偿使用制度。
　　第二十七条 自治县依法加强森林资源的保护和管理，植树造林，封山育林，保护天然林，发展优质高效林，提高森林综合效益。
　　自治县因执行国家天然林保护政策而减少的收入，享受上级国家机关给予的补偿。
　　第二十八条 自治县的自治机关加强畜牧业基础设施建设，扶持发展特色养殖业，依靠科学技术，逐步建立和完善良种繁育、疫病防治和加工销售等服务体系。
　　自治县保护水产资源，发展渔业生产，加强渔政管理。
　　第二十九条 自治县的自治机关发展旅游业，对自治县旅游资源实行属地管理，统一规划，加强保护，合理开发利用。
　　自治县鼓励和支持各种经济组织和个人投资开发旅游项目，保护投资者的合法权益。
　　第三十条 自治县的自治机关在资金、物资、技术、信息等方面扶持帮助贫困乡村，合理开发、利用本地资源发展经济，改善群众的生产生活条件。
　　自治县引导和组织农村富余劳动力向非农产业和城镇转移。
　　第三十一条 自治县的自治机关保护和管理本行政区域内的矿产资源。鼓励和支持单位和个人依法勘探、开采可以由自治县开采的矿产资源。
　　自治县征收的矿产资源补偿费，专项用于矿产资源的保护、管理和开发，并享受上级国家机关的照顾。
　　第三十二条 自治县加强农村公路基础设施建设、养护和管理，保障农村公路畅通。
　　自治县在上级国家机关的支持和帮助下，发展邮政、电信、通信、信息网络事业。
　　第三十三条 自治县的自治机关根据自治县的特点制定城乡建设规划，逐步组织实施，建设具有民族特色、环境优美、清洁卫生的城镇和村寨，逐步改善城乡人民的生活环境和居住条件。
　　第三十四条 自治县的自治机关加强环境保护和管理，改善生态环境和生活环境，防治污染和其他公害，促进人口、资源和环境的协调发展。
　　自治县新建、改建和扩建的工程项目，必须执行环境影响评价制度，防止对环境的污染和破坏。
　　自治县征收的排污费，专项用于环境保护。
　　第三十五条 自治县的自治机关加强安全生产监督和管理，保障人民群众的生命财产安全。
　　第三十六条 自治县加强市场和商业网点建设，建立商品贸易和物资集散中心，促进商品流通。
　　自治县享受国家扶持民族贸易的优惠政策的照顾。
　　第三十七条 自治县的自治机关自主管理隶属于自治县的企业、事业单位。上级国家机关需要改变其隶属关系时，必须征得自治机关的同意。
　　上级国家机关在自治县的企业、事业单位，应当尊重自治县的自治权，遵守自治条例和单行条例，接受自治机关的监督。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第四章　　　财政管理

　　第三十八条 自治县的自治机关加强财源建设，建立和完善公共财政体系。自主安排使用属于自治县的财政收入。
　　自治县的自治机关加强对预算外资金的管理。
　　自治县设立并安排少数民族发展资金和民族工作经费。
　　第三十九条 自治县享受上级财政支持自治县财政保证国家机关正常运转、财政供养人员工资按时足额发放、基础教育正常经费支出的照顾。
　　自治县享受上级财政通过一般性财政转移支付、专项财政转移支付、民族优惠政策财政转移支付以及国家确定的其他方式的照顾。
　　第四十条 自治县的自治机关自主安排基本建设项目。自治县享受上级国家机关安排的基础设施建设项目减少或者免除配套资金的照顾。
　　第四十一条 自治县因国家政策调整或者重大自然灾害，造成财政减收部分，报请上级财政给予补助。
　　第四十二条 自治县的自治机关对某些需要从税收上加以照顾和鼓励的项目，报经批准，可以实行减税或者免税。
　　第四十三条 自治县根据经济社会发展的需要，依法设立地方商业银行和城乡信用合作组织。
　　自治县支持县内金融机构在法律和政策规定的范围内，采取多种形式，筹集、融通资金，为自治县经济社会建设服务。
　　第四十四条 自治县的自治机关充分发挥审计机关的作用，依法对自治县内各级财政的收支和财政金融机构、企业事业组织以及其他同国家财政有关的单位的财务收支及其经济效益进行审计监督，严格财经纪律。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第五章　　　社会事业

　　第四十五条 自治县的自治机关贯彻执行国家的教育方针，依照法律法规规定，制定教育发展规划，决定各类学校的设置和办学形式。
　　自治县普及九年义务教育，发展高中教育、职业技术教育、成人教育、学前教育、特殊教育和现代远程教育。
　　自治县的自治机关鼓励社会力量依法办学。
　　第四十六条 自治县设立寄宿制、半寄宿制学校，办好民族中学和民族小学。保障就读学生完成义务教育阶段的学业，逐步实行免费义务教育。
　　自治县设立奖励扶助资金，资助非义务教育阶段的贫困学生完成学业。
　　第四十七条 自治县的自治机关坚持教育和经济协调发展的方针。在经济发展的基础上，用于教育的财政拨款的增长比例应当略高于财政经常性收入的增长比例，并使在校学生平均人数的教育费用逐步增长。
　　自治县的自治机关确保财政转移支付按照国家规定足额用于教育事业。
　　第四十八条 自治县的自治机关加强教师队伍建设，提高教师待遇，尊重和维护教师的合法权益。
　　第四十九条 自治县的自治机关建立健全科技服务体系和科学普及体系，推广先进适用技术，加快科技成果转化，鼓励和支持民营科技产业发展。
　　自治县的自治机关鼓励自主创新，保护知识产权。
　　自治县的自治机关对在自治县经济建设和社会发展中作出突出贡献的科技人员实行特殊津贴。
　　第五十条 自治县的自治机关加强文化基础设施建设和公共文化服务体系建设，加强文化市场管理，发展具有民族特色的文化事业和文化产业。
　　自治县加强对非物质文化遗产的搜集整理和民族历史文物、名胜古迹等的抢救和保护，开发利用民族文化资源。
　　第五十一条 自治县的自治机关加大卫生事业投入，加强公共卫生基础设施建设，建立和完善农村卫生服务体系、新型农村合作医疗制度和医疗救助制度。开展爱国卫生运动，加强对传染病、地方病、职业病的预防和控制。加强妇幼保健工作。
　　自治县依法加强对食品药品安全、医疗器械的管理和监督，保护和发展中医药，挖掘利用民间医药。
　　第五十二条 自治县实行计划生育，提倡优生优育。对只生一个孩子或者两个女孩的农村夫妻给予奖励扶助。
　　自治县的自治机关保护妇女、儿童、老人和残疾人的合法权益。
　　第五十三条 自治县的自治机关建立与经济发展水平相适应的社会保障体系。建立和完善养老、失业、医疗、工伤、生育保险和城市居民最低生活保障、社会救助等制度，发展社会福利事业。
　　第五十四条 自治县的自治机关重视发展体育事业，加强公共体育设施建设，开展全民健身运动和民族传统体育活动，增强各族人民体质。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第六章　　　民族关系

　　第五十五条 自治县的自治机关保障自治县内各民族依法享有的平等权利，加强各民族的团结，调动各族人民建设社会主义的积极性。
　　第五十六条 自治县的自治机关照顾自治县内散居少数民族的特点和需要，帮助他们解决生产、生活中存在的实际问题。在处理涉及本行政区域内各民族的特殊问题时，应当与他们的代表充分协商，尊重他们的意见。
　　第五十七条 自治县的自治机关保护各民族都有使用和发展自己语言文字的自由，都有保持或者改革自己风俗习惯的自由。各民族公民都有信仰或者不信仰宗教的自由，尊重各民族人民的传统节日。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第七章　　　附　　则

　　第五十八条 每年11月7日为自治县成立纪念日，放假1天。
　　第五十九条 本条例自1988年11月7日起施行。

Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11